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Executive summary: this paper will provide a short summary of a bigger research work that 
was performed to: 1. to develop a management tool that would enable the management of 
offshore operations to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the offshored services, 
2. to test this tool empirically. The research was started as a result of real-life 
observations that pointed out high management dissatisfaction with offshore counterparty 
performance, especially where it concerned less structured activities. This paper, 
therefore, will address the current flaws in the observed performance management 
framework, and it will propose a new approach that will address observed inconsistencies 
in current approach.  
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/4969. 
 
1.  Introduction 
The topic for this paper was formed as a result of real-life observations at a big financial 
organization that had offshoring practices in different areas of operations, from IT to 
Financial and Management Accounting. The first observations pointed out that the less 
structured and organized the offshored activities are, the less satisfied is the onshore party 
with offshore counterparty’s performance. Furthermore, this dissatisfaction was not 
expressed in formal evaluations, which implied that the daily work was performed 
satisfactorily by offshore counterparty. The main problem seemed to be the discrepancy 
between what was measured and evaluated and what management expected from offshore 
counterparty. 
 
The existing literature on the management of the offshore services at the time was also 
confirming the initial findings by citing the following statistics. The actual savings on 
labour costs for financial firms in 2008 could range from 20% to 70%, depending on the 
effectiveness of the management of the offshore services (knowledge@emory, 2008). 
Another citation from sandhill.com (2007) states “many sourcing deals that 
underperformed have been effectively diagnosed to have had weak and ineffective 
governance processes and structures”. Unfortunately, the remedies that the articles 
provided were mostly based on “best practices” and not on a rigorous scientific research. 
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Another problem was that very often different parts of the overall offshoring strategy 
would be addressed without explaining how a remedy for that particular part would fit in 
the overall offshoring strategy of the firm. For example, one frequently cited tool that 
would help to manage offshore services better was “more communication”. However, 
more communication also means more costs and more effort and, therefore, it does not 
necessarily fit in the overall approach of a firm. Therefore, the all-inclusive guidance was 
required for the management of the offshored services to address challenges in this area. 
 
The all-inclusive approach that will be analyzed in this paper is referred to as 
“performance management framework (or PMS)”. The main research question that is to be 
answered at the end of this paper is “How performance management system for offshore 
operations should be structured in order to increase efficiency and effectiveness of 
offshore operations?” To answer this question the following steps will be performed next.  
 
In part one a theoretical research will be done to explore the previous works in this area 
and to see how other works can contribute to the topic of this paper. This research will de 
done for different part of the performance management system and it will address the 
following questions: 1. Overall offshoring strategy, 2. What to offshore? 3. How to control 
offshore activities? 4. Offshoring approach in time perspective. All questions will be 
consistently approached from 3 different perspectives: transaction-based economics (TCT), 
resource-based view (RBV), and trust-based view. All three views try to explain how to 
minimize the threats of opportunistic behaviour, information asymmetries, and uncertainty 
while planning and executing on offshoring strategy.  
 
The end-result of theoretical research will be a development of a management tool, 
performance management system for the offshored services. This system will integrate 
different parts of PMS that are described in part one. Next, PMS framework will be tested 
high-level using the financial firm where the initial real-life observations were done. The 
overall approach to this test as well as sample choice and research design will be 
elaborately discussed in part two of this paper. The goal of this qualitative test is to get 
the first impression on how real-life cases are reflected in the created framework, and 
what type of analysis can be performed based on this framework. 
 
The results of the empirical research will be presented in part three, and part four will 
follow with a detailed analysis of the results. The results will be compared with the initial 
expectations that are documented in the developed PMS framework. Any deviations from 
this framework will be highlighted and elaborately discussed. Finally, in section five of the 
paper conclusions and recommendations will be made. Conclusions and recommendations 
will be addressed to the financial firm that is subject to the case study.  
 
Next, a theoretical research on performance management system for the offshored 
services is presented. 
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2. Prior literature 
The research in offshoring area in prior literature concentrates around three main 
perspectives: transaction cost theory (TCT), resource-based view (RBV), and trust-based 
view. The research in these areas will be used in this section to analyze how it impacts 
different components of performance management framework for offshore services: 
overall strategy, activities, governance structure and controls. Next, conclusions will be 
drawn on how this research can be used to create a cohesive performance management 
tool for offshore services. Finally, a performance management framework for offshore 
services will be developed at the end of this section based on prior research. 
 
2.1 Offshoring strategy 
Offshoring strategy sets the overall direction regarding offshoring practices and provides an 
overall guidance for a firm on how these practices should be managed, measured, and 
evaluated. Operational objectives, performance measures, and control mechanisms should 
all be traceable back to the overall strategy and business objectives. This section will 
describe what basic offshoring options are available to firms and what trade offs, in terms 
of risks and benefits, are considered when setting the overall offshoring strategy.  
 
A choice for a certain mode of operation depends on management perceptions regarding 
the following offshoring benefits (Kedia & Mukherjee, 2008) 
- Disintegration advantages, which are achieved by unbundling of activities from 
the value chain vis-à-vis integrated firms serving in the same industry. 
These advantages include reduced coordinating costs; better focus on core 
capabilities; increased flexibility, speed, and responsiveness due to modular 
structure 
- Location. Assuming condition one is satisfied, it must be more advantageous for a 
firm to procure resources from outside the country to perform certain functions 
then executing the same in the country. 
The advantages include labour, time, and knowledge arbitrage; country level 
advantages in terms of, for example, economic deregulation and liberalization   
- Externalization. Assuming condition two is satisfied, it must be more 
advantageous for a firm to externalize those functions to foreign providers or 
internalize those functions to be performed in-house in the foreign land by setting 
up centre. 
The advantages include co-specialization and organizational learning and reduced 
costs by tapping into specialized supplier capabilities 
 
Offshoring risks relate to foreign country risks and to the flaws of imperfect markets that 
give rise to adverse selection and moral hazard within offshore transactions.  
- Adverse selection refers to the situations where bad offshore agent is selected by 
accepting lower fees in the markets where perfect information about agents and 
agent pricing is not available to the principals 
- Moral hazard refers to the situations where offshore agent has more information 
about actions and the results of those actions than the principal. This can lead to 
opportunistic behaviour from agent side when the interests of principal and agent 
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are not perfectly aligned and agents’ actions cannot be perfectly monitored by the 
principal 
 
Finally, the operational risks also increase when operating from offshore location. 
Operational risks arise when tasks are achieved with less efficiency and quality than 
onshore. This can be due to either transitional phase in offshoring strategy execution or 
the limitations of communication transmission system, presence of cultural gap, or 
geographical separation. 
 
Kedia and Mukherjee (2008) use the following framework to show and describe how firms 
make a decision with regards to offshoring strategy and a mode of operations based on 
above described considerations. 
 
Firms that strive for offshoring advantages in terms of co-specialization and organizational 
learning and that are less concerned with loss of control or operational inefficiencies will 
chose for either domestic (I) or offshore outsourcing (II). It will give these firms the 
possibility to focus on their core capabilities and to increase their competitiveness through 
increased service and/or product quality, and decreased time to market for their products 
or services. Firms that go for domestic option (I) in this case will consider the risks of 
having operations in foreign country higher that the advantages that foreign location has to 
offer. 
 
Quadrant I and IV represent offshore bystanders that can either have domestic mindsets or 
lack of experience in managing from distance (Carmel & Agarwal, 2006). Some other 
reasons could be that these firms do not have a more demanding skills challenge at home, 
or they operate in an industry that is characterized by non-differentiated products (Boyer, 
2007). It can provide firms with sustainable competitive advantage and remove the 
incentive to gain this advantage by tapping into global opportunities.  
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Finally, quadrant III, which refers to the case study in this research, represents firms that 
are willing to take advantage in terms of labour, time, and knowledge arbitrage that 
offshore locations present. However, these firms are either restricted in their activities by 
rules and regulations, or they consider the risks in terms of loss of control or operational 
failures to be very high. Therefore, they try to internalize location advantages and to 
manage it within the existing hierarchy through captive offshoring. This mode of 
operations requires availability of strong management skills and tools to be able to manage 
internal operations from a long distance and to ensure a similar level of control. 
 
Strategic decision gives a direction to further definition of activities and processes that can 
be considered for offshoring. The higher are the risks and uncertainty perceived by a firm 
with regards to offshoring, the more conservative it will be regarding what activities to 
offshore. Next section will discuss the main determinants behind the decision what 
functions and what activities to offshore while bearing in mind the strategic requirements 
for captive offshoring.  
 
 
2.2 What to offshore? 
The question what activities to offshore will be answered in this section using prior 
research in three different areas, transaction cost theory, resource-based view, and trust-
based view and a captive offshoring as a mode of operations. The examples that will be 
used for illustrational purposes all come from financial industry because offshoring 
practices in this industry are already at a very advanced stage, these practices are very 
diverse in nature, and the case study in this article also concerns a big financial institution. 
 
Transaction costs theory. Williamson (1975, 1986) defined transaction costs as those 
associated with an economic exchange that vary independently of the competitive market 
prices of the goods or services exchange. A simpler definition for it is “a cost incurred in 
making an economic exchange” (answers.com). In the context of this research transaction 
costs will concern the costs of monitoring and managing activities.  
 
According to Nicholson et al. (2006) these costs differ per activity depending on the 
following characteristics:  
- Uncertainty or the degree of specifiability of intended performance. The more 
uncertainty is involved in a certain transaction, the more will be the need to 
extensively monitor and manage this activity from a long distance 
- Asset specificity or the degree of customization required to perform a certain task. 
Customization refers to a specific knowledge or skills that are required to perform a 
certain transaction. High degree of customization can give rise to opportunistic 
behaviour from offshore agent. Extensive monitoring will be required to prevent it 
- Frequency of the transaction. This factor in combination with highly uncertain and 
highly customized transactions can increase the costs of transactions dramatically 
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Nicholson (2006) argues further that the financial activities higher in the organizational 
hierarchy (e.g. management accounting) are characterized by high uncertainty and high 
asset specificity. These activities are highly customized to business’ internal and external 
environments, are prone to frequent adjustments, and produce highly sensitive data. They 
are, therefore, less suitable for offshoring because they will create a prohibitive level of 
transaction costs in terms of extensive management and monitoring of these activities. 
 
Youngdahl and Ramaswamy (2008) support this view by introducing the “knowledge 
embeddedness” factor in process description. Processes with higher level of information 
embeddedness will contain a higher amount of tacit knowledge, which refers to “the 
elements that cannot be captured in repeatable routines that can be codified and 
transferred.” As the level of knowledge embeddedness increases, operations progress from 
performing simple transactional services to providing more complex solutions. This also 
means that the complexity of managing the process of offshoring such delivery increases. 
 
Kehal and Singh (2006), also argue that processes with a fairly high degree of codifiablity 
and, therefore, low uncertainty, are suited for offshoring the best. Another variable they 
introduce is the degree of interconnectedness of offshore processes with core processes. 
The preferable candidates for offshoring are processes with low to medium degree of 
interconnectedness with core processes. Offshore operations then will require less 
communication and coordination efforts. In addition, core processes will be less subject to 
stoppages in processing pipeline due to infrastructural or communicational failures.  
 
Finally, the processes to be offshored should also be labour intensive (Stratman, 2008) or, 
in other words, they should require a fair amount of manual processing in order for 
offshoring case to make commercial sense. 
 
To conclude, TCT and its proponents concentrate on minimizing the costs that are required 
to conduct offshore transaction. Therefore, the processes that should be brought offshore 
are the ones that not only minimize the costs of direct labour, but also require minimum 
effort in terms of monitoring and managing it. These activities are characterized by low 
knowledge embeddedness, low interconnectedness with core processes, high codifiability, 
high labour intensity, low uncertainty, low asset specificity, and high frequency of 
transaction. However, captive offshoring is not only done to capture cost and time 
arbitrage but also knowledge differential advantages. Next section will explore this topic 
further. 
 
Resource-based view. While TCT concentrates mostly on negative market conditions and 
structures to eliminate those, RBV builds on the notion of a bounded level of trust in every 
market: “the expectation that the partners will not always be opportunistic even if they 
have the opportunity and the incentives for it” (Vivek, et al., 2009). This view 
concentrates more on a value creation through proper resource management and firm’s 
ability to create unique and non-transferable core competencies. The competencies will 
then constitute firm’s sustainable competitive advantage.  
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The proponents of RBV argue that firms can create sustainable competitive advantages 
through collective learning because collective learning in the organization eventually 
results in process optimization and technology integration. To build collective learning 
firms need to increase the knowledge intensity of offshore processes. That requires shift 
from transaction specific investments, which aim to minimize coordination and monitoring 
costs, to core specific investments, which increase onshore party involvement in process 
flow (Vivek, et al., 2009). 
 
Offshoring processes with high knowledge embeddedness, medium/high uncertainty, high 
asset specificity, and high interconnectedness with core processes gives both parties a 
chance to collectively learn more about process flow and to add value to it through smooth 
migration, improvement initiatives, and redesign. Besides, it gives resources the 
opportunity to improve their coordinating and integrating skills, which makes resource pool 
unique and non-transferable. Talent-based advantage will also compensate for reduced 
labour arbitrage due to wage inflations, currency fluctuations, and offshore government 
initiatives. 
 
Trust-based view. Vivek et al. (2009) refers to it as a view that “blurs the firm boundaries 
opening the door for evolutionary and ever changing organizational form.” Joint value 
maximization takes precedence over single firm cost maximization and activities that are 
transferred offshore focus on continued association between onshore and offshore partners 
(Vivek et al., 2009). These activities can include sharing of strategic planning and 
knowledge at this stage. Transaction costs mediating mechanisms are partially or 
completely replaced by a notion of trust in offshore party gained through partner 
experience (Dekker). 
 
To conclude this section, the processes that firms offshore will depend on: strategic focus 
in terms of costs, time, and knowledge arbitrage; onshore experience in managing offshore 
activities; offshore partner experience. The next step in performance management 
framework is to determine what controls to apply to monitor and manage offshore 
activities. This topic is analyzed in the next section. 
 
 
2.3  How to control offshore activities? 
TCT. Management accounting scholars have been using transaction cost theory to analyze 
current offshore governance and control practices and to explain it from the perspective of 
transaction costs control for different service exchange events. Spekle (2001), for 
example, argues that control suitability for a certain transaction is a function of the 
following three characteristics (Nicholson, 2006): 
- the ease of ex ante programmability (or predictability) of the outcomes 
- the degree of asset specificity 
- the extent of information impactedness 
Based on these characteristics a choice can be made between five categories of controls: 
market controls, arm’s length controls, machine controls, exploratory controls and 
boundary controls.   
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Machine control is a preferable option for activities with high degree of ex ante 
programmability of outcomes. It means that for these activities it will be fairly easy to 
associate required actions with desired outcomes and controls, therefore, can be defined 
in terms of desired outcomes or required actions. Result-driven controls will involve clearly 
pre-defined performance targets and performance-linked rewards system. Action-driven 
controls will involve standardization of behaviour, the setting of codified norms and rules, 
close monitoring, rewards for obedience, and punishment for disobedience. 
 
Another proponent of TCE view, Stratman (2008), suggests enterprise resource planning as 
control mechanism for offshore activities where the main goal is cost reduction. ERP is an 
example of advanced machine control. It deploys common data structures that facilitate 
communication between corporate management and sub-units. It allows for easier 
monitoring and reduces coordination costs and transaction risk by limiting the potential for 
opportunism and eliminating information asymmetry. 
 
Arm’s length controls will be used for activities with moderate level of ex ante 
programmability (moderate uncertainty). They are articulated in terms of market-based 
performance benchmarks and ex-ante contractual provisions. Performance is assured by 
enforcing the adherence to contractual arrangements, and arbitration is stipulated in 
contracts to resolve conflicts. 
 
Exploratory or boundary controls are applied to transactions with low levels of ex ante 
programmability and high level of uncertainty. Exploratory controls are defined as very 
informal arrangements with very little explicit guidance. The focus is mainly on peer 
pressure within the group that results from high interconnectedness of activities. Boundary 
controls intend to prevent cases of irremediable and “incorrigibly high levels of” 
information impactedness. They focus on prescriptive code of conduct, ethical behaviour 
and activities that are off limits for the prevention of a limited set of undesired outcomes 
and unwanted behaviour that can be anticipated ex ante. Boundary controls are stated in 
negative terms as minimum standards (Nicholson, 2001) 
 
All above-described controls refer to transactions with moderate to high levels of asset 
specificity or transaction customization to customer needs. Spekle (2001) argues that 
transactions with low asset specificity, irrespective of their level of uncertainty, can be 
handled the best by market forces as market pressures are relatively high on the providers 
of these services (Nicholson, 2001). 
 
RBV. RBV adopts a more dynamic view on a firm as opposed to a static TCT view. While 
TCE focuses on discrete transactions and decisions related to it at a certain point in time, 
relational view concentrates on continuity of association or social exchange between 
onshore and offshore parties in the future. This has its major implications on control 
objectives and mechanisms. 
 
While TCE proponents focus on outcome controls and strive to ensure deliverability against 
the lowest costs possible, RBV proponents argue that firms should manage for development 
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of core specific assets in order to create competitive advantage. Core specific assets are 
expressed in terms of “the extent to which resources contribute to the competitive 
advantage of the firm” (Vivek, et al., 2008). These core competencies must be unique and 
non-transferable in order to contribute to firm’s competitive advantage. 
 
In order to develop core competencies management should switch its control focus from 
deliverability and time management to management for quality, knowledge development, 
and process improvement. Control focus shifts from outcome control to process monitoring 
and development of complimentary capabilities. Deliverability becomes a hygiene factor. 
Technology and training drive quality of the process (Vivek, et al., 2008). This shift 
reinforces the learning curve within offshore entity. 
 
Next, control mechanisms such as machine controls and highly specified service level 
agreements will be replaced by a more extensive use of exploratory and boundary controls. 
These controls set a minimum process requirement and behavioural expectations but they 
also stimulate cooperation and knowledge sharing between onshore and offshore party. 
 
Trust-based view. Trust based view goes even further than RBV and argues that as time 
passes managerial control from onshore site decreases in its importance and mutual 
strategic planning and cooperation emerge. Onshore party increases its relation-specific 
investments in mutual strategic planning and cooperation, managerial control, bilateral 
governance, and knowledge intensity of the processes. These investments in offshore 
partner development increase mutual dependence (Vivek, et al., 2008), which constitutes 
a very strong control mechanism. 
 
Mao et al. (2008) tested offshore vendor perceptions on trust and control. His findings 
show that clients’ control over vendor, in terms of cultural blending and goal setting, had 
a significant impact on cost control but had no impact on project quality. On the other 
hand, trust building in terms of effort invested by onshore party in information sharing, 
quality of communication, and inter-firm adaptation had a significant impact on project 
quality as measured by client satisfaction, quality of results, and standards set. However, 
it did not have any significant impact on cost control. 
 
To conclude, above research suggests that control objectives, focus, and mechanisms 
evolve together with the evolvement of onshore-offshore relationship. TCE and its 
principles play important role at the onset of the relationship where agent principle 
problems have to be mitigated by stringent control measures. As relationship develops, 
TCE controls will be gradually replaced by core- and relation-specific investments and trust 
will start to play an increasingly important role as control mechanism. Next section will 
discuss the evolution in onshore-offshore relationship and performance management 
framework in more detail. 
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2.4 Offshoring approach in time perspective 
Different authors argue that offshoring event is not static but very dynamic in its nature. 
Research by Kehal and Singh (2006) shows that as time passes the focus of offshoring 
activities gradually shifts from simple repetitive tasks to more uncertain and complicated 
tasks. 
 
Another research by Yuongdahl and Ramaswamy (2008) illustrated that offshoring expertise 
gradually grows from simple tasks processing in process centre to unique capability centre 
with knowledge intensive processes and core capabilities. The strategic focus in process 
solution centre shifts from executing certain services to transforming these services 
through increased knowledge-based capabilities. 
 
As offshore activities evolve so should also the mechanisms that control these activities. 
Vivek et al (2009) explain in their research that as firm’s strategy changes from reducing 
transaction costs to developing new competencies and resources, the focus of control 
mechanisms is also adjusted to reflect this shift. The primary goal of this adjustment is to 
add value to existing processes through bilateral governance and increased strategic 
cooperation.  
 
Forrester Research in IT industry (2003) showed that offshoring follows four stages of 
development, from bystanders to experimenters, to committeds, to full exploiters. 
Governance mechanisms shift from establishing the overall offshoring strategy to 
encouragement to increase the use of offshore services (e.g. cultural blending). Finally, as 
full exploiter, client concentrates on upgrading offshore processes and methodologies using 
offshore expertise (advancement stage) and shares the risk/rewards resulting from it.  
 
To conclude, offshoring cannot be researched as a static event as this strategy evolves 
over time. Therefore, the dynamics of offshoring will be taken into account in the next 
section, where the performance management framework for offshore services will be 
developed. 
 
2.5  Performance Management Framework for offshore services 
This section brings together the items discussed above in a coherent performance 
management framework for offshore services. Similar to the views presented above, 
different opinions exist on how performance management framework should be created 
and used.  
 
One view represents a static approach where key objectives are defined first. They are 
then translated into strategies and plans, the performance targets are set and the 
reward/punishment system defined and implemented. Information flows are defined to 
accommodate “learning organization”, employee empowerment, and emergent strategy 
(Otley, 1999).  
 
On the other hand, the proponents of RBV propose a more dynamic approach to PMS. Henri 
(2006) argues that strategy should not be taken as a given to derive the rest of PMS from 
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it. Instead, performance management system should be designed to influence strategy via 
the development of distinctive and valuable capabilities: market orientation, 
entrepreneurship, innovativeness, and organizational learning. He proposes to combine the 
diagnostic use of PMS, which focuses on mistakes and negative variances, with the 
interactive use, which is used to expand opportunity seeking and learning throughout the 
organization. This combination creates tension which will lead to the development of 
organizational capabilities.  
 
The PMS framework that is presented below integrates TCT, RBV and trust-based views to 
define characteristics for strategy, objectives, activities, and controls at different stages 
of offshoring. The model assumes that at the beginning of offshore relationship the 
offshore centre is mainly used for cost cutting purposes. This centre gradually develops 
into important contributor to global knowledge, skills, and core capabilities base as 
relationship evolves. Frequent evaluations should be done by onshore partner to determine 
at what stage of development the offshore relation is and how to manage it properly. 
 
The first column in the below presented framework represents the initial stage in 
offshoring that is covered by TCT and its principles. Offshoring here is mainly done for cost 
cutting purposes and the objectives are to minimize direct and indirect transaction costs. 
To achieve that, manual, repetitive processes with little interaction requirements and low 
knowledge embeddedness are brought offshore. These activities are governed by result- or 
action-driven controls that focus primarily on timely and accurate delivery of pre-defined 
products. 
 
The second column represents a more advanced stage in offshoring relationship governed 
by RBV and its principles. The shift to this column can be driven by internal and external 
factors. Internally onshore party gains more experience in managing global resources. 
Externally competitive pressures increase and offshoring for cost cutting objective does 
not constitute a sustainable competitive advantage any longer. Strategic shift is, 
therefore, required to capitalize on offshore location advantages in terms of knowledge 
differential to improve product or service quality and time to market. 
 
When above-mentioned factors are present, the following changes will occur in PMS. 
Onshore involvement in offshore operations increases. The knowledge embeddedness of 
offshore processes and its interconnectedness with core onshore processes increase, and 
the processes become more business specific. Controls that will be applied at this stage 
are ex-ante contractual provisions and performance benchmarks. Gradually more use will 
be made of exploratory and boundary controls to stimulate information exchange. Controls 
will also have to be complemented by interactive use of PMS and social measures, that 
keep focus on collective goals and objectives. Control focus shifts from results 
deliverability to quality of delivered results, knowledge development, and process 
improvement. 
 
Last column in PMS framework is covered by trust-based view and its principles. Earlier 
shifts make sure that the level of expertise by offshore party increases; offshore party is 
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more attached to a company and pursues collective goals; onshore trust in offshore partner 
increases. The next step in the relationship is to advance core capabilities that contribute 
to company’s competitive advantage. Core capabilities represent not only executing but 
also managing functions at this stage. Managing global network of differing skills set 
becomes one of the most important contributors to company’s competitive advantage. 
 
At this stage offshore processes are not only transferred from onshore location but they 
are also developed offshore. Processes that are transferred from onshore refer to strategic 
decision making and business partnering. Trust and social controls become the most 
important governance mechanisms, and offshore partner is made co-responsible for 
company results. Social controls enable social interaction, cooperation, social attachment, 
information exchange and they stimulate discussion, which is necessary for company 
dynamics. 
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Above discussion is summarized in below PMS framework. This framework will be evaluated 
empirically in the next section using a real case example. 
 
Cost/Time arbitrage   Knowledge arbitrage 
 Transaction costs theory Resource-based view Trust-based view 
Assumptions 
No previous experiences  
with offshoring 
Offshore over-performance on key 
control metrics 
Full trust in offshore  
party's capabilities 
  
Distrust of foreign operations & 
institutional framework 
Positive personal experiences  
onshore about offshore party 
Full trust in offshore  
party's work ethics 
  
High perceived macro- and 
micro risks 
Competitive pressures to increase 
quality, time-to-market, flexibility 
Integrated process execution 
& monitoring 
  
No managerial experience 
in global operations 
Increased global management  
capabilities 
Advanced global management  
capabilities 
Strategy 
Minimizing costs of non-core 
activities 
Develop global operating base for 
non-core & core processes 
Leverage global core capabilities 
to create competitive advantage 
  
Concentrating on & developing 
core activities onshore 
Develop unique & non-transferable 
global core capabilities 
Leverage global core capabilities 
to develop new opportunities 
  Clearly defined and fixed Frequent re-adjustments  Constantly evolving 
Objectives  
Reduce operating costs for  
non-core processes 
Increase internal pressures for high 
performance 
Reduce costs through better 
problem-solving skills 
  
Reduce management costs for 
non-core activities 
Improve coordinating and 
integrating skills 
Enhance cooperative and trusted 
environment 
  
Increase flexibility of non-core 
cost base 
Streamline and optimize core  
processes 
Leverage core processes to 
enhance competitive position 
Activities 
Processing jobs, highly 
predictable outcomes 
Analytical work, hardly predictable 
outcomes 
Strategic planning, unpredictable 
outcomes 
  Transaction specific investments High core asset specific investments Relation specific investments 
  
Low interconnectedness with 
core onshore processes 
High interconnectedness with core 
onshore processes Integrated core processes 
  Low knowledge embeddedness  High knowledge embeddedness  
High strategic knowledge 
embeddedness  
  High degree of codifiability Low degree of codifiability Uncodifiable activities 
  Sequential or pooled order Reciprocal execution order Unstructured activities 
  High frequency of operations Regular frequency of operations Periodical execution 
Governance  Internal hierarchy Sharing of managerial control Bilateral governance 
Control focus 
Deliverability of process 
outcomes Quality of processes and outcomes Goal & planning achievability 
  
Standardization of processes 
& behaviour 
Increasing knowledge-intensity of 
the processes 
Increasing strategic knowledge-
intensity of the processes 
  
Achievement of targets set, 
feedback function 
Expanding opportunity-seeking & 
learning 
Expanding organizational borders & 
possibilities 
Control  
mechanisms 
Mainly quantitative  
performance metrics 
Quantitative & qualitative 
performance metrics 
Increasing use of qualitative 
performance metrics 
  Outcome-oriented Process-oriented Strategic target-oriented 
  Result-driven machine controls Exploratory and Boundary controls  Boundary controls 
  Action-driven machine controls Vertical integration Social controls 
  
Punishment for 
underperformance Non-monetary incentives Trust & Cooperation 
  ERP 
Technological process  
improvements 
Technology relates to seamless  
process integration 
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3. Methodology 
The following factors had to be taken into account when considering different methods for 
empirical study on this topic. First, performance management framework in a random 
company will not be a result of elaborate scientific study but a result of direct and indirect 
interaction between a certain firm and its particular environment. A basic understanding 
of firm’s context and environment is, therefore, required to draw conclusions. Second, this 
study involves personal interactions across firms, or inter-firm relationships, over time. A 
detailed analysis of individual firm’s interactions over time is required to account for this 
factor. 
 
Taking into account the above-mentioned factors and the novelty of the topic the research 
methodology chosen was, first, to perform a detailed case study of a single organization to 
appreciate the context in which it operates and the reciprocal impact of context and 
organization. Second, to perform a semi-structural survey within the case study to test the 
inductive generalizations made (Otley, 1999). As this study is not longitudinal, firm’s 
archival data and records helped to understand the context in which a firm operates 
today. Survey was used to fill in the blanks in the model left out by archival analysis. 
 
Sample. Finance department of a big financial firm was chosen for empirical testing of the 
presented PMS framework. This approach helps to concentrate on diverse processes that 
can be ranked according to their complexity within Finance organization and can then be 
placed in one of three PMS pillars for further research. Finance activities in this research 
include procure-to-pay (AP), management accounting, financial accounting, cost 
accounting, balance sheet, and product control processes. 
 
Archival data analysis contains a thorough analysis of firm’s initial offshoring strategy, 
objectives, control framework and mechanisms. Next, firm’s top management evaluations 
of its offshore practices and regular operational reviews using key performance indicators 
are used to draw conclusions on different perceptions in the organization. Finally, a semi-
structured survey is used to complement archival analysis. To prevent bias in response 5 
employees from different departments and different hierarchical levels were interviewed. 
Departments interviewed were cost, revenue, balance sheet and intercompany accounting. 
Each interview took 1-1,5 hours on average. 
 
Questionnaire. Different components of presented PMS model were operationalized using 
previous researches described above. Each model component was broken down into 
characteristics that the previous researches used to construct that component and to place 
it into TCT, RBV or trust-based perspective. As this research is highly qualitative in its 
nature, multiple-choice questions were used to determine component absence, presence, 
or relative stage in its evolution/growth. In addition, the respondents were asked to 
indicate if any other option was applicable in their situation. 
 
Based on archival analysis and the results of questionnaire the following picture emerged 
for the offshoring practices of this firm. 
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4. Results 
 
A detailed analysis of the above results follows in the next section. 
 
Cost/Time arbitrage Knowledge arbitrage
  Transaction costs theory Resource-based view 
Assumptions 
Simultaneous implementation of offshoring in multiple 
departments/no gradual approach 
Onshore party is highly satisfied with offshore party's 
performance on current key performance indicators 
  
High perceived operational risks in terms of employee 
retention, key man exposure, loss of control over 
offshore activities, no process improvements offshore 
Offshore parties are very consistent and consequent 
in their performance and task prioritization 
 
  
Limited managerial experience in global operations 
due to local "Netherlands" scope of operations 
Competitive pressures exist onshore due to scarcity of 
qualified finance professionals 
  
Onshore reorganization and unstructured handover  
offshore activities    
  
Onshore party is dissatisfied with overall offshore 
performance   
  
Distrust in offshore party's capabilities to perform 
complex tasks   
Strategy 
Cost reduction for finance activities, realization of 
targeted cost savings controlled by tight budgets   
  
Concentrating on feasible opportunities for offshore 
operations based on already offshored operations    
  
Strategic benefits in terms of scope enlargement of 
already offshored functions   
Objectives  
Reduction of operating costs for administrative, back 
office tasks Processes were described and codified by handover  
  
Reduction of management costs for administrative, 
back office tasks   
Activities 
Management accounting (revenue management, 
product control), financial accounting (balance sheet), 
cost accounting, intercompany reconciliations 
The actual outcomes of offshore processes depend on 
data/process quality and data/process knowledge  
 
  
Processing parts of multiple onshore activities are 
offshored/no end-to-end processes including 
responsibilities 
Frequent and intensive communication between 
onshore and offshore parties is required to achieve 
acceptable process results 
  
Investments are done in handover of onshore 
transactions and training of offshore personnel to 
perform the highly defined tasks 
Knowledge of business, processes, rules and 
regulations is required to be able to perform activities 
independently 
  
Knowledge of process steps is required to perform 
current offshore tasks 
High key man exposure 
 
  
High degree of codifiability given current process 
description 
High information impactedness as onshore party has a 
very limited knowledge of offshore operations 
    
Reciprocal execution order as onshore and offshore 
counterparties work in parallel 
    
Regular frequency of operations = monthly closing 
activities 
Governance  Extended team model Sharing of HR control 
  
Effective management control resides onshore  
Functional expertise is kept onshore 
Effective operational control resides offshore 
 
Control focus Timely delivery of process outcomes Quality of outcomes is also considered 
  Enhancing predictability of outcomes  
  Achievement of targets set, feedback function  
Control  
mechanisms 
Operational key performance indicators 
 
G-SAT index 
 
  
Timeliness, turnaround time, documentation 
 
Includes process, knowledge, quality, and proactive 
attitude orientation 
  
Punishment for underperformance = lower KPI 
scores/bonuses   
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5. Analysis 
Archival analysis shows that offshoring practices in this organization started in 2004 with 
the clear goal to realize costs savings. To achieve that goal as many finance activities as 
possible had to be transferred from onshore to a captive offshoring centre in India. The 
only two other factors that had to be considered were the feasibility of the transfer, in 
terms of HR and regulatory restrictions, and a strategic fit within existing Finance 
organization. 
 
The governance model chosen was that of an extended team per region per offshore 
function. Each onshore team was replicated at offshore location but control and expertise 
over deliverables were to be retained onshore. Cost control was achieved by setting clear 
targets and performing yearly budget evaluations. Operational control was achieved by 
defining and documenting key performance indicators in terms of timeliness, turnaround 
time, quality (accuracy), and documentation. Management control was achieved by 
introducing index that would determine management satisfaction scores using questions. 
These questions refer also to knowledge embededdness and process enhancement at 
offshore location. 
 
Activities that were transferred offshore represent a mix from different functions, starting 
from accounts payable and intercompany reconciliations to cost, financial and 
management accounting. Furthermore, according to service level agreements, these 
activities represent steps in end-to-end reporting processes, with onshore party providing 
input and controlling output of the overall activity. Offshore activities belong to different 
levels in financial hierarchy and require different levels of expertise and interaction.  
 
Thus, archival analysis shows a mixed picture for offshore activities. On one hand, there is 
a clear cost cutting strategy and objectives, supported by the “extended team” 
governance model and clear operational KPIs with the focus on timely deliverability. On 
the other hand, some of the activities transferred require a lot of interaction with onshore 
team, subject expertise, and frequent adjustments. In addition, the index introduced for 
management control purposes includes items that question knowledge embededdness and 
process enhancement at offshore location, factors that clearly belong to RBV prospective.  
 
Furthermore, management index shows highly unsatisfactory scores, whereas KPIs exhibit 
very high scores for offshore performance. Onshore party indicated during interviews that 
offshore performance is very low where it concerns process change management, process 
improvement, and proactive attitude with regards to task prioritization and problem 
resolution. One of the reasons is that offshore party tries to avoid “overt” conflicts and 
interruptions in the processes because it can potentially harm their KPI scores. Another 
reason is that onshore party avoids transferring additional knowledge or ad hoc requests 
due to high perceived risks and finance process complexities. 
 
During interviews it also became clear that offshore party possesses more knowledge about 
offshore processes, which results in high information impactedness and high key man 
exposure offshore. In fact, the effective control over offshore operations resides with 
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offshore party. Next, offshore processes are subject to frequent adjustments in internal 
and external environments and they require frequent interaction with onshore party to 
enable process execution but, also, to guarantee proper process outcome. This frequent 
interaction does not support current cost cutting objective of the company.  
 
In terms of management controls, it effectively resides with onshore party and offshore 
party involvement in overall decision making is very limited. Furthermore, onshore party 
uses scorecards to control offshore operations. Time aspect, responsiveness, and error 
limitation are indicators of performance that deserve a lot of attention in these cards. 
These indicators are well and narrowly defined in service level agreements. The narrow 
definition and a clear focus on deliverability of operational controls cause a big gap 
between KPIs and scorecards on one hand and a much broader defined index on the other 
hand. KPIs do not cover the full potential of current offshore processes. 
 
The results of this analysis are summarized in PMS framework, presented in section three. 
They show a certain degree of incoherence in current approach. Even though the company 
tried to position itself entirely in TCT perspective, there are certain important elements 
that fall into RBV column based on performed analysis. This will be discussed in the next 
section, where conclusions and recommendations will be made. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and recommendations  
This research looked at offshoring practices from three different perspectives, transactions 
costs economics, resource-based view, and trust-based view. Based on prior research and 
taking into account the dynamics of inter-firm relationships, a performance measurement 
framework was created for offshore services. This framework included the following 
components: assumptions, strategy and objectives, activities, governance and controls, 
and it assumed that all components develop over time due to changes in internal and/or 
external environment. However, to achieve high performance in offshore services the PMS 
should retain a certain degree of coherence through all changes.  
 
Using this framework the empirical study was performed within finance organization of a 
big financial firm. The initial results clearly showed that even though the offshore services 
scored high on daily operations, the management of the firm was not satisfied with the 
overall performance of offshore partner. Based on the analysis of archival records and 
semi-structured interviews with firm’s employees the PMS framework was filled with data 
for this company. The conclusion was that this company’s approach to its offshore 
operations shows a certain degree of incoherence that causes management dissatisfaction. 
 
While the overall company strategy is to minimize costs by offshoring as many processes as 
possible, in reality most of the financial processes offshore do not support this objective 
due to high degree of uncertainty, information impactedness, knowledge embededdness, 
and high interaction requirements. These process characteristics are also not reflected in 
narrowly defined operational key performance indicators for offshore services. Thus, while 
offshoring strategy is focused on cost cutting and operational controls support it, the 
 223
processes exhibit more potential and cause high agency costs and management 
dissatisfaction.  
 
To increase management satisfaction with offshore services, the overall approach should 
be re-evaluated and it should be determined if: 
- cost cutting strategy is still relevant given internal and external developments 
- offshore processes are fully exploited in terms of their contributed value to overall 
firm’s performance 
If based on above evaluation the company decides to move away from cost-arbitrage, 
current strategy, objectives, governance and operational controls should be moved more 
towards RBV driven approach. It will involve re-evaluating current offshore employees’ 
capabilities and compensation packages; increased involvement of onshore party in 
offshore processes; increased transfer of managerial control to offshore location; 
introduction of qualitative, process-oriented performance metrics and cultural trainings. 
 
When company decides to further pursue the cost-cutting strategy, current offshore 
processes should be re-evaluated and structured to minimize interaction requirements and 
information impactedness. In addition, different, more structured and standardized 
manual activities could be considered for offshoring for scale purposes. This will bring back 
the coherence in overall approach by placing it in TCT-driven column. As a result, 
management expectations regarding offshore services will decrease and satisfaction will 
increase. 
 
Given these recommendations there are certain opportunities for future research. A more 
quantitative research can be performed to empirically test the relationship between PMS 
constructs (individual and combined), the degree of coherence between constructs, and 
the actual firm satisfaction with offshore performance. Larger and more diverse samples 
can be used by translating the semi-structured questionnaire into structured questionnaire 
using the insights gained in this research. Future empirical research can help to better 
quantify and generalize the results over multiple industries, companies, and functions.  
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